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ABSTRACT
Urban consolidation centers (UCCs) have a key role in many initiatives in urban logistics, yet few
of them are successful in the long run. The high costs often prevent attracting a sufficient number
of UCC users. In this paper, we study sustainable business models and the supporting role of
administrative policies. We perform an agent-based simulation applied to the city of Copenhagen
and collect data from a variety of sources to model the agents. Both the data and case setup are
validated by means of expert interviews. We test 1,458 schemes that combine several administra-
tive measures and cost settings. Most schemes yield significant environmental benefits; many of
them reduce the truck kilometers driven by about 65% and emissions by about 70%. The key
challenge is to identify schemes that are also financially sustainable. We show the importance of
committing carriers to the UCC as soon as possible, as carriers potentially generate the bulk of the
revenue. Subsequent revenues may be generated by offering value-adding services to receivers.
Based on the numerical experiments, we pose various propositions that aid in providing favorable
conditions for a UCC, improving its chances of long-term success.
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1. Introduction
Urban populations are growing rapidly; a projection by the
United Nations estimates that in the year 2050, an add-
itional 2.5 billion people will be living in urban areas
(United Nations, 2014). Therefore, the retail sector in cities
is growing fast as well, causing an increase in the volumes
of urban freight transport (Transmodal, 2012). Spurred by
the fierce competition with e-commerce and expensive in-
shop storage (due to high real estate prices), just-in-time
principles gain popularity among retailers, resulting in low
storage levels, small order volumes, and more frequent
orders (Crainic et al., 2004). Retailers nowadays often
impose narrow delivery windows and expect fast delivery. In
addition, stricter regulations enforced by municipalities limit
transport accessibility to urban shopping areas. Due to these
developments, freight flows are becoming increasingly frag-
mented, making it difficult to plan efficient routes for small
freight carriers in particular; such carriers comprise about
85% of the transport market (Dablanc, 2011).
The surge in the number of freight transport movements
has a hazardous impact on public health, the environment,
and the quality of life in urban areas. Freight transport com-
prises about 15% of total traffic in cities, yet causes up to
50% of traffic emissions and disproportionally contributes to
external costs such as noise hindrance, road congestion, and
traffic safety (Dablanc, 2011). Another concern—especially
relevant for many European cities—is that historic city cen-
ters with narrow streets are unfit to facilitate large-scale
freight transport (Ambrosino et al., 2007). Heavy truck
transport therefore has a considerable impact on congestion
in streets and shopping areas.
The imminent need to improve the efficiency and to
reduce the environmental impact of urban freight transport
is recognized by both companies and local governments.
Urban consolidation centers (UCCs) have a central role in
many solution concepts to reduce the impact of urban
freight transport (Quak, 2008; Transmodal, 2012). A UCC
located at the edge of the city enables inbound trucks to
unload without entering the city and to perform last-mile
transport in an efficient and environmentally friendly man-
ner. Especially for inbound trucks with poor capacity utiliza-
tion, significant efficiency gains may be made by bundling
goods into a single delivery vehicle. Despite the theoretical
benefits, the vast majority of UCCs have failed in practice
(Browne et al., 2005). The extra costs introduced in the sup-
ply chain have proven to be a major barrier to overcome.
Overdependence on subsidies also is a common pitfall for
UCCs. Recent research implies that combining bundling
with initiatives such as off-hour deliveries while providing
appropriate incentives might aid users’ adoption (Marcucci
& Gatta, 2017). This is particularly true for retailers who
perceive the combined measure as both feasible and con-
venient (Holguın-Veras, 2008). Examples of currently stable
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operating UCCs are Binnenstadservice in the Netherlands,
Gnewt Cargo in the UK, and CityDepot in Belgium; common
characteristics is that they lack permanent subsidies and offer
extensive value-adding services (Bohne et al., 2015).
Most successful schemes combine company-driven initia-
tives with government policies (Browne et al., 2005). The
commitment of companies is essential, yet supportive regu-
lation and subsidies are typically required as well. Despite a
handful of successful UCCs being in existence, knowledge of
sustainable business models remains limited (Allen et al.,
2012). In this paper, we perform a simulation study to
increase insight into the success factors of a UCC. We take
the city of Copenhagen, Denmark as a test case, due to
available expertise for this city, as well as having representa-
tive properties of a typical European city (e.g., moderate
size, historical city center, pedestrian streets). We use real
data for the UCC location, retailer locations, and the street
network. To accurately represent the actors involved in the
urban supply chain, we collect data from various studies.
Our test case is validated by means of expert interviews.
This paper aims to contribute to literature by identifying
sustainable business models for UCCs and the administra-
tive measures that best support such models. Although sev-
eral studies have been performed on the subject, they
typically consider small, simplified networks, test only few
scenarios, and do not model agents in accordance with data
obtained from practice. As such, they ultimately offer few
insights into good practices for UCCs and how to deploy
administrative policies to elevate UCC success rates. This
study offers new insights by performing experiments on an
instance based on realistic data, validating the experimental
setup via expert interviews, and testing over 1400 scenarios.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In
Section 2, we provide a literature review. We proceed to dis-
cuss the proposed methodology in Section 3. The experi-
mental setup is described in Section 4. Section 5 presents
and discusses the results of the simulation experiments. The
main conclusions are presented in Section 6.
2. Literature review
A UCC is a logistics facility that is located in the proximity
of an urban area, allowing to decouple and bundle inbound
freight flows (Browne et al., 2005). By consolidating ship-
ments a UCC may perform last-mile delivery more effi-
ciently than individual carriers (Huschebeck & Allen, 2004;
Quak & de Koster, 2009). In addition, the UCC may dis-
patch small and environmentally friendly vehicles more suit-
able for last-mile delivery. The potential benefits are highest
when considering freight flows that are inefficiently organ-
ized (Browne et al., 2005; Van Rooijen & Quak, 2010).
Verlinde et al. (2012) point out that transport might be
organized efficiently from the perspective of the carrier, but
not from the perspective of the city, e.g., a truck may visit
multiple cities during the same route.
On a high level, two business models for UCCs can be
distinguished (Van Rooijen & Quak, 2010). In the first one,
carriers outsource their urban deliveries to the UCC. The
costs for last-mile distribution are disproportionally high for
carriers, as travel speeds are low, unloading is time-consum-
ing, truck capacity may be significantly underutilized, and
local regulations may be restrictive. Despite these incentives,
the price of outsourcing is often too high for carriers (Kin
et al., 2016; Van Rooijen & Quak, 2010). In the second busi-
ness model, the receiver in the urban area selects the UCC
as its delivery address. By bundling multiple deliveries into
one the receiver spends less time (and thus costs) on receiv-
ing goods. However, as shipping costs are generally
embedded in order prices, outsourcing costs typically exceed
the efficiency gains (Verlinde et al., 2012). For the retailer,
the key merits of the UCC are value-adding services such as
(i) temporary storage, (ii) waste collection, (iii) e-tailing
logistics, (iv) home deliveries, and (v) specialized services
such as splitting pallets into smaller loads or putting clothes
on hangers (Allen et al., 2012; Van Rooijen & Quak, 2010).
Municipalities often incorporate administrative measures
to reduce the negative effects of heavy freight transport,
which may be beneficial for UCCs. Quak and de Koster
(2009) divide administrative measures into three classes,
namely (i) road pricing (e.g., a price per kilometer for cer-
tain vehicle types), (ii) licensing and regulation (e.g., truck
bans, license fees or limited access times based on weight or
engine class), and parking and unloading (e.g., a dedicated
unloading bay for small trucks). By working with light and
environmentally friendly vehicles, the UCC may obtain a
competitive advantage over larger trucks used by carriers.
In an elaborate review, Browne et al. (2005) analyze 67
UCC schemes, considering operational schemes, trials, and
feasibility studies. They report that the vast majority of
UCCs is unable to survive in the long term. The main rea-
sons for failure are (i) the high costs of the extra transship-
ment and (ii) a lack of added value from the perspective of
both carriers and receivers (Browne et al., 2005; Van Duin
et al., 2010; Verlinde et al., 2012). The aforementioned sour-
ces indicate that UCCs are often unable to generate a suffi-
ciently high throughput to reach the break-even level
required for a sustainable business model. The inability to
attract sufficient users is partially caused by a lack of exter-
nal support. In the startup phase of a UCC, municipalities
often provide subsidies. When this financial support is
ended, the UCC is often unable to survive (Browne et al.,
2005; Kin et al., 2016). Permanent subsidy schemes rarely
exist in practice (Browne et al., 2005), even though such
funding might be rationalized by environmental benefits.
As the low success rate of UCCs might suggest, little ana-
lysis has been performed on their long-term success factors
(Van Rooijen & Quak, 2010). There is often an absence of a
clearly defined target group of potential UCC users. Many
freight flows are already efficiently organized; transship-
ments may actually make them less efficient (Van Rooijen &
Quak, 2010). Furthermore, retailers, carriers, and municipal-
ities may all benefit in some way from a UCC, yet strive to
accomplish divergent objectives (Bektas¸ et al., 2017).
Reducing environmental costs—especially by means of poli-
cies—often comes at a financial cost for the actors involved,
such that system-wide optimization fails to generate
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solutions to which autonomous actors would commit in prac-
tice (Geroliminis & Daganzo, 2005). Despite the lack of success
of UCCs so far, the concept remains relevant. The aforemen-
tioned trend of freight flow fragmentation makes the potential
added value of UCCs more prominent than it was in the past.
Also, operational costs may be reduced by adopting state-of-
the-art technology and by better integrating the handling pro-
cess within the supply chain (Triantafyllou et al., 2014).
Most UCC studies analyze cases, often evaluating past per-
formances or focusing on best practices. The broadest case
study to date is performed by Browne et al. (2005), analyzing
67 schemes throughout Europe. Examples of case studies
evaluating one or several UCCs are Marcucci and Danielis
(2008) (Fano), (Triantafyllou et al. 2014) (Southampton),
Nordtømme et al. (2015) (Oslo), and Van Duin et al. (2016)
(London, Bristol, Nijmegen). A number of insights on UCC
business models may be derived from these studies. Carriers
are particularly skeptical about UCCs, partially because they
often view the UCC as a competitor. Existing UCCs therefore
tend to focus more often on committing receivers. Financial
challenges are very common for UCCs, especially those run-
ning without subsidies. Furthermore, proper alignment
between policies and the UCC operations appears essential.
More broadly speaking, including all stakeholders from an
early stage is deemed an important prerequisite for success.
Due to a lack of publicly available data on the operations
of UCCs and their business models, some authors turned to
modeling to assess the concept of UCCs and obtain new
insights. A common modeling approach for UCCs is to
reflect their operations as a vehicle routing problem, contrast-
ing the performance of direct transport and transport via the
UCC. We highlight some examples. Van Rooijen and Quak
(2010) focus on the environmental gains stemming from
using the UCC. Jacyna (2013) also zoom in on environmental
gains, citing improved material flows and reduced emissions.
Roca-Riu et al. (2016) study the feasibility of UCCs from the
perspective of collaborating carriers, and state that average
distance costs may be reduced significantly. More complex
variants consider one or two layers of hubs rather than a sin-
gle consolidation center. De Assis Correia et al. (2012) study
a UCC setting with multiple hubs, and claim that consider-
able gains can be made in transport efficiency. A two-echelon
variant may be found in Hemmelmayr et al. (2012).
A limitation of routing-based approaches is that they only
address transport efficiency, ignoring the effects on other
stakeholders. Agent-based simulation takes into account such
effects. Taniguchi et al. (2014) state that agent-based simula-
tion is the most applicable method to study the behavior of
and interaction between the various agents in the complex
environment of urban logistics; various research efforts have
been made in this direction. Tamagawa et al. (2010) evaluate
the effects of road pricing and truck bans, using a learning
model to reflect agents’ decision-making under evolving cir-
cumstances. Van Duin et al. (2012) address the financial
model and environmental impact of UCCs, studying various
settings for UCC service fees, road pricing, and subsidies.
Wangapisit et al. (2014) research the use of UCCs when com-
bining parking constraints with carrier subsidization. A recent
trend foresees the integration of agent-based modeling with
discrete choice modeling to characterize agents with utility
functions based on stated preference data. See for instance the
work of Marcucci et al. (2017), which simulates stakeholders
interactions in urban freight transport via opinion dynamics
models, taking inspiration from Le Pira et al. (2017).
The goal of our simulation study is to identify urban
logistics schemes that (i) reduce the environmental impact
of freight transport in the city center, (ii) are based on a
financially sustainable business model, and (iii) incentivize
commitment of the actors involved.
3. Methodology
As stated in the previous section, agent-based simulation is a
suitable tool to analyze urban logistics schemes. For this study
we apply the agent-based simulation framework of Van
Heeswijk et al. (2016). This framework explicitly focuses on
the synergy between business initiatives and administrative
policies. Also, it segregates decision-making into various time
periods of commitment, corresponding to the process that we
aim to emulate. The agent types included in the framework
are receivers, carriers, the UCC, and the municipality, all pur-
suing their own objectives within the constraints of the sys-
tem. We selected these agent types, as together they abstractly
represent the dynamics of transport decisions within the city.
The receivers, carriers, and UCC form a basic transport sys-
tem, with the receivers and carriers both having a direct
influence on the system. Demand and supply patterns are
assumed to be given, which is why shippers are not included
in the model. Finally, the municipality indirectly represents
the interests of stakeholders such as residents, but also exer-
cises a direct influence on the transport system.
At the heart of the framework is a discrete-event simula-
tion over a finite decision horizon, with T ¼ f0; 1; :::;Tg
representing a set of decision epochs separated by 1-day
intervals. There are three levels of decision-making (stra-
tegic, tactical, and operational), which we discuss in more
detail in Section 3.2. Strategic decisions are fixed at the start
of each simulation run, i.e., at t¼ 0. Tactical decisions can
only be made at a limited set of decision epochs T tac  T
and in this study are fixed for two months. Finally, orders
(i.e., goods demanded by the receivers) are randomly gener-
ated at every decision epoch t 2 T , upon which all agents
make their operational decisions. Section 3.3 describes the
cost functions and KPIs of the agents.
We denote the set of receivers by R, the set of carriers by C,
and the UCC by h. To individual agents we refer as r 2 R and
c 2 C, respectively. The street network is represented by the
graph G ¼ fV;Ag, with the vertex set V containing both the
UCC location and the retailer locations, and the arc set A con-
necting the vertices. The travel time between any pair of vertices
is obtained with OpenStreetMap (OSM Foundation, 2017).
We discuss six key assumptions. First, all orders that are
generated at a given decision epoch are delivered before the
subsequent decision epoch, significantly speeding up the
simulation. The limited delivery windows allow for less bun-
dling flexibility for the UCC; in practice higher efficiencies
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SUSTAINABLE TRANSPORTATION 677
might be achieved. Second, all agents update their tactical
decisions at the same decision epochs, again chiefly consid-
ering computational speed. This assumption may cause
more fickle behavior by the agents, however, we note that
agent behavior eventually converges to a steady state. Third,
order frequencies and order volumes of receivers are fixed
during the simulation. O’Rourke (2014) states that the retail
sector moves to demand-driven supply chains, in which cus-
tomer demand is a leading factor for their order patterns.
The potential drawback in the simulation is that retailers
may fail to adopt cheaper order policies. Fourth, receivers
and carriers make their decisions whether to join the UCC
independent of each other (i.e., with respect to decisions
made at the same epoch), eliminating the need to model
responsive agent behavior. Although simplifying reality, the
expert interviews confirm that users generally have little
knowledge regarding the negotiations between UCC and
other parties. Fifth, costs decrease when the amount of vol-
ume handled by the UCC increases, reflecting economies of
scale. For the UCC, such economies of scale are confirmed
both by literature (e.g., Kin et al., 2016; Malhene et al., 2012;
Van Duin et al., 2010; Van Duin et al., 2016; Verlinde et al.,
2012) and the expert interviews, although the magnitude
and curve depend on the UCC-specific equipment and oper-
ations. Literature is inconclusive on the curve shape of
economies of scale; only on the bounds we can make justi-
fied assumptions. In this paper, we assume a linear relation
between costs/prices and the volume ratio. Price levels are
adjusted relative to the costs, and are therefore also linear
with respect to the volume. Sixth, if a user commits to the
UCC, all its shipments are handled by the UCC until the
next tactical decision moment. In practice, users may wish
to only outsource part of their loads. This paper only mod-
els the smaller flows for which outsourcing is of interest,
leaving larger truckloads outside of the scope. Our assump-
tion reflects the practice in which user and UCC typically
sign a contract for a fixed period of time during which a
predetermined set of loads or customers is agreed to be out-
sourced. For example, a carrier may contractually agree to
outsource loads for various small customers, while delivering
larger customers itself. Note that if a receiver commits to
the UCC, the carrier is only obliged to deliver shipments
destined for this specific receiver at the UCC.
3.1. Outline of the simulation framework
In this section, we describe the general outline of the simu-
lation framework. We start by introducing the notation
required to define the problem state. Let l 2 L ¼ f1y ; :::; 1g
be the volume of an order, with y 2 N. The element l repre-
sents volume in terms of the vehicle capacity of the smallest
vehicle type that is defined in the simulation, such that l¼ 1
equals a full truckload of this vehicle type. It follows that
every order can be transported by any vehicle. A unique
combination of carrier, receiver, and volume represents the
order type (c, r, l). The number of orders of a given order
type is denoted by It;c;r;l 2 N. Now, let It ¼
ðIt;c;r;lÞ8ðc;r;lÞ2CRL be a vector that provides the number of
orders per order type demanded at time t. All orders placed
at decision epoch t are delivered before tþ 1, e.g., within
one day. Every combination of numbers per order type
demanded represents a unique order arrival; let Xt be the
set of all possible order arrivals at decision epoch t. We rep-
resent arrivals of new orders with the variable
xt ¼ ðeI t;c;r;lÞ8ðc;r;lÞ2CRL, with xt 2 Xt . The order demand
of receivers is generated according to the random variable
Wt, with xt representing a simulated realization of Wt. As
all orders in the system at t are delivered before the next
decision epoch tþ 1, orders from previous decision epochs
have no impact on the system. Thus, at every decision epoch
t 2 T , we update the orders in the system as follows:
It;c;r;l ¼ eI t;c;r;l 8 c; r; lð Þ 2 C R L; (1)
Based on the order arrivals, both the UCC and the car-
riers decide on their delivery routes. To determine which
orders should be shipped via the UCC, we keep track of the
agents that have committed themselves to use the UCC. The
binary variable crec;trt;r 2 f0; 1g represents whether receiver r
makes use of the base service of the UCC (i.e., bundled
deliveries) at time t; the vector crec;trt ¼ ðcrec;trt;r Þ8r2R stores
this information for all receivers. The variable crec;valt;r 2
f0; 1g and the vector crec;valt ¼ ðcrec;valt;r Þ8r2R have similar
purposes, but instead describe whether the receiver outsour-
ces its value-adding services to the UCC. For a receiver to
outsource its value-adding services, it must pay the fee for
the base service as well, i.e., crec;valt;r can have a value of 1 if
and only if crec;trt;r ¼ 1. Finally, the variable ccart;c 2 f0; 1g and
the corresponding vector ccart ¼ ðccart;c Þ8c2C describe whether
the carrier outsources its last-mile transport to the UCC.
To reflect economies of scale for the UCC, various price-
and cost functions of the UCC are updated based on the
ratio between the volume that passes through the UCC and
the total volume that enters the city. We discuss this updat-
ing procedure in Section 3.2; for our definition of the prob-
lem state it suffices to introduce the notation for the volume
ratio. Let lucct0;t00 2 ½0; 1—with t0; t00 2 T tac and t0<t00—be the
volume handled by the UCC in the period between the
most-recent tactical decision epoch t00 and the second most-
recent tactical decision epoch t0, divided by the total order
volume entering the city during the same time period.
We have now introduced all elements necessary to define
the problem state. The problem state is comprised of five ele-
ments: the vector of orders It, the vector of receivers that use
the base transport service of the UCC crec;trt ¼ ðcrec;trt;r Þ8r2R,
the vector of receivers that outsource their value-adding serv-
ices to the UCC crec;valt ¼ ðcrec;valt;r Þ8r2R, the vector of carriers
that use the UCC ccart ¼ ðccart;c Þ8c2C, and the volume ratio lucct0;t00 .
We denote the problem state at time t as
St ¼ It; crec;trt ; crec;valt ; ccart ; lucct0;t00
 
: (2)
3.2. Agent intelligence
In this subsection, we describe the agent intelligence
embedded in the simulation model. Small and independent
actors typically do not use state-of-the-art algorithms; we
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reflect this practice by representing the decision processes of
actors with relatively simple heuristics. As explained in the
previous section, we distinguish between decisions made on
the strategic, tactical and operational level, which we separ-
ately discuss here. Figure 1 provides a flowchart of the simu-
lation model, describing the sequence of the decisions that
are made by the various agent types.
In our simulation, strategic decisions are made only by
the municipality. These long-term decisions are fixed at
t¼ 0 for the duration of the simulation run and involve
deciding on the subsidy levels, setting the length of the sub-
sidy period (after which subsidies are set to 0), determining
the accessibility measures to the city, and setting the policy
costs. We select administrative measures that are conceivable
to be implemented in practice by the municipality of
Copenhagen. In this simulation model, we test one accessi-
bility measure, namely an access time window; large trucks
may only drive in the environmental zone within this win-
dow. This measure is close to practice as it is currently in
effect in Copenhagen; we test three settings for the access
time window. Furthermore, we set one cost measure, which
is the zone-access fees, i.e., a fixed fee per large truck enter-
ing the environmental zone of the city. Currently, the city of
Copenhagen works with relatively cheap access licenses for
trucks, in the past it also charged higher access fees for cer-
tain truck types. The access fee measure is therefore also
consistent with practice. As the UCC uses small trucks, it is
exempted from both measures. Finally, the real Copenhagen
UCC has been co-funded for a period of 2 years as well.
At the appropriate decision epochs, tactical decisions are
made sequentially by the municipality, the UCC, and then
(in parallel) by the receivers and carriers. Receivers and car-
riers make the decision to outsource to the UCC independ-
ent of each other. Carriers that are not committed to the
UCC are only obliged to visit the UCC to deliver goods des-
tined for receivers that are committed to the UCC.
Furthermore, it is possible that both the carrier and the
receiver are committed to the UCC, although financial
incentives may change if one of the actors is committed. In
particular, carriers have little financial incentive to use the
UCC if their receivers already pay the UCC for last-
mile delivery.
We describe the steps of the tactical decision level. First,
the municipality may alter its subsidy levels, which are
expressed as a percentage of the price charged by the UCC.
If the UCC itself receives subsidies, it lowers its prices pro-
portionally. When the municipality allocates subsidies to
multiple agent types, their effect is cumulative, e.g., when
both the UCC and the carriers are subsidized for 20%, the
effective price reduction is 40% for carriers and 20% for
receivers. The subsidy percentages are fixed at the start of
the simulation, and are always set to 0% at the end of the
Figure 1. Flowchart of the simulation model.
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subsidy period. Second, cost- and price levels of the UCC are
adjusted based on the volume ratio lucct0;t00 , which has been
defined in Section 3.1. This mechanism reflects the economies
of scale that are achieved by handling larger volumes. In this
section we focus on the updating procedures; the cost- and
price variables (or functions) themselves are explained in
more detail in Section 3.3. At each tactical decision epoch, we
update three price variables and two cost variables:
For each of the aforementioned cost- and price variables,
we define a range that contains the values that the variable
may take. We express the volume handled by the UCC as
the ratio of the total volume that enters the city (i.e., the
cumulative volume of the target group). A ratio of 0 corre-
sponds to the highest cost- and price levels, a ratio of 1 cor-
responds to the lowest levels. We provide an example of the
updating procedure for the price variable Pucc;rec;trt ; the other
cost and price variables are updated in a similar manner.
Let Pucc;rec;tr be the upper price bound and Pucc;rec;tr be the
lower price bound. The volume ratio lucct0;t00 determines the
price level within this range. We update receiver prices as
follows:
Pucc;rec;trt ¼ ð1 lucct0;t00 Þ  Pucc;rec;trþlucct0;t00  Pucc;rec;tr:
After adjusting the subsidies, cost levels, and price levels,
the receivers and carriers independently and in parallel
decide whether or not to commit to the UCC. For any agent
that chooses to use the UCC, the UCC becomes responsible
for the last-mile distribution of all the agent’s goods, until at
least the next tactical decision epoch. The decision to opt-in
or opt-out is based on the expected future costs of both
options given the updated subsidy levels. To compute the
expected future costs at a given tactical decision epoch, we
first generate N sample paths of order arrivals that stretch
ssample decision epochs into the future, with n 2 f1; :::;Ng
being the index for the sample path and tn 2 f1; :::; ssampleg
being the time index for the sample states of path n. For
every n 2 f1; :::;Ng, we obtain a set of sample
states feStþ1n ; :::;eStþssamplen g.
In each sample state eStþtn , we keep all but one binary
variable at the same level as in St, i.e., for each agent we
base our forecasts on the UCC commitments as they are
before the update. We introduce the help variablesecrec;trr 2 f0; 1g;ecrec;valr 2 f0; 1g, and eccarc 2 f0; 1g to compute
cost forecasts for both the case in which it uses the UCC
and the case in which it does not commit to the UCC.
Based on the generated sample states, we compute the
expected costs with the cost functionseCrecðeStþtn ;ecrec;trr ;ecrec;valr Þ and eCcarðeStþtn ;eccarc Þ; these functions
are similar to the functions that we define in Section 3.3.
Computing the costs for the sets of sample states yields the
expected future costs for both the case in which the agent
unilaterally decides to use the UCC and the case in which
the agent opts for direct transport. Minimizing the expected
future costs yields the updated tactical decision. The follow-
ing equations show how we update the tactical decision for
the receivers and for the carriers:
crec;trt;r ; c
rec;val
t;r
h i
¼ arg min
ec rec;valr 2 0;1f g
ec rec;trr 2 0;1f g;
1
N
XN
n¼1
Xssample
tn¼1
eCrec eStþtn ;ecrec;trr ;ecrec;valr
 
8r 2 R; (3)
ccart;c ¼ arg mineccarc 2 0;1f g
1
N
XN
n¼1
Xssample
tn¼1
eCcar eStþtn ;eccarc
 
8c 2 C: (4)
We now discuss the operational decisions of the simula-
tion model, which are made at every decision epoch t 2 T .
Based on the realization of the random variable Wt—which
translates into receivers placing orders—shipments are
assigned to carriers. Both carriers and the UCC make rout-
ing decisions for the last-mile distribution. We use the
Clarke-Wright savings algorithm to construct routes, fol-
lowed by a 2-opt improvement heuristic. Such an approach
is similar to the routing algorithms that are often applied in
practice (Quak & de Koster, 2009). We represent the result-
ing routes as follows. Let Qucc be the set of vehicles operated
by the UCC, with q 2 Qucc referring to an individual vehicle.
The vehicle notation for carriers is similar. The delivery
route of vehicle q within the city is an ordered set of arcs,
denoted by ducct;q (d
car
t;c;q for carriers). When generating routes,
we take into account the capacity of the vehicle and possible
access time restrictions. To satisfy these restrictions, an
agent may need to dispatch multiple vehicles at a single
decision epoch, which results in multiple routes being exe-
cuted by a single agent; sets of routes are denoted by Ducct
and Dcart;c respectively. Finally, we use Dt ¼ Ducct [ [c2C Dcart;c
to denote the set of all routes executed at t.
3.3. Cost functions and KPIs
To quantify the results of the study, we monitor both envir-
onmental performance and financial performance. We meas-
ure environmental performance with six indicators, namely
CO2 emission, SO2 emission, NOx emission, PM2:5 emission,
the number of vehicles in the urban area (itemized per
vehicle type), and the distance covered per vehicle type.
The four different agent types, along with their objectives,
constraints and KPIs, are listed in Table 1. We note that—
with the exception of the municipality—all objectives are
strictly financial, reflecting the fact that the transport sector
is mainly cost-driven (Crainic, 2012). Furthermore, consid-
erations such as convenience and reliability are left out as
the test setting is typified by hard time windows and deter-
ministic travel times. However, we do note that in practice,
convenience and reliability are relevant success factors for
Pucc;car;trt Price charged to the carrier for outsourcing its last-mile
distribution, a fixed fee per outsourced delivery stop that
is identical for each carrier;
Pucc;rec;trt Fixed fee for the base service of bundled deliveries as charged
to the receiver, identical for each receiver;
Pucc;valt Receiver-dependent fee for performing value-adding services;
Cucc;hdt Volume-based costs for handling goods at the UCC;
Cucc;valt Receiver-specific cost to perform value-adding services.
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UCCs. We are chiefly concerned with the profitability of the
UCC; therefore, we set profit maximization as its objective.
The revenue operations of carriers and receivers are outside
the scope of the model, therefore we adopt a cost-minimiz-
ing perspective for these agents. We proceed to formalize
the cost functions of the agents. We only introduce the
notation required for a general understanding of the frame-
work; for a more detailed representation we refer to Van
Heeswijk et al. (2016).
We start by defining the cost function for the carriers. To
distinguish between routes that visit all delivery addresses and
routes that only visit the UCC, we again use the help variableeccarc . Let Dcart;c jeccarc ¼ 0 be the route set corresponding to the
case in which the carrier visits all its delivery addresses (pos-
sibly including the UCC) itself, and let Dcart;c jeccarc ¼ 1 corres-
pond to the case in which the carrier only visits the UCC. The
function Ccar;trðÞ returns the transport costs for a given route
set, including the unloading costs at the receivers. With
Ccar;trðDcart;c jeccarc ¼ 0Þ we obtain the transport cost that corres-
pond to the carrier visiting all its delivery addresses itself;
Ccar;trðDcart;c jeccarc ¼ 1Þ yields the transport costs if the carrier
only visits the UCC. If the carrier outsources its last-mile dis-
tribution, the only destination of the route is the UCC. The
information embedded in the route set suffices to compute the
total travel time, the number of receivers visited, and the zone-
access fees paid. If the carrier outsources its last-mile distribu-
tion, a fixed amount per stop must be paid to the UCC. These
costs are represented by Pucc;car;trt ðDcart;c jeccarc ¼ 0Þ—the route
notation contains the number of stops that are outsourced—
and depend on the price charged by the UCC at time t.
Finally, Pcar;ucc;sbt ðDcart;c jeccarc ¼ 0Þ denotes the subsidy that the
carrier receives when using the UCC, which is a fixed percent-
age of the price per stop it pays to the UCC. The cost function
of carrier c 2 C at time t is given by
Ccart c
car
t;c ;D
car
t;c jeccarc ¼ 0;Dcart;c jeccarc ¼ 1
 
¼ 1ccart;c
 
Ccar;tr Dcart;c jeccarc ¼ 0
 
þ ccart;c Ccar;tr Dcart;c jeccarc ¼ 1
 
þccart;c Pucc;car;trt Dcart;c jeccarc ¼ 0
 
ccart;c Pcar;ucc;sbt Dcart;c jeccarc ¼ 0
 
:
The costs incurred by the receiver are comprised of the fol-
lowing five elements: (i) the receiving costs
Crec;rcðr;Ducct ;[c2C Dcart;c Þ incurred for physically receiving deliv-
eries, which depend on the number of vehicles that visit its
premises and—in case of visiting carrier trucks only—whether
shifted access windows are imposed, (ii) the receiver-specific
costs for performing value-adding services in-house Crec;valðrÞ,
(iii) the costs for outsourcing last-mile transport to the UCC
Pucc;rec;trt (i.e., the base service of bundled deliveries, for which
the UCC charges the same fixed fee to every receiver), (iv) the
receiver-specific costs for outsourcing value-adding services to
the UCC Pucc;valt ðrÞ, and (v) the subsidy income when using
the UCC Prec;ucc;sbt , which is a fixed percentage of the price that
is paid to the UCC for the base service. The cost function of
receiver r 2 R at time t is
Crect r; c
rec;tr
t;r ; c
rec;val
t;r ;Dt
 
¼ Crec;rc r;Ducct ;[c2C Dcart;c
 
þ 1crec;valt;r
 
Crec;val rð Þ þ crec;trt;r Pucc;rec;trt
þcrec;valt;r Pucc;valt rð Þcrec;trt;r Prec;ucc;sbt :
For the UCC, transport costs are calculated similarly to
those of the carriers and are denoted by Cucc;trðDucct Þ. The
remainder of the costs and prices of the UCC are time-vary-
ing. The handling costs of incoming orders for the UCC are
denoted by Cucc;hdt ð[c2C Dcart;c Þ and the costs for performing
value-adding services are given by Cucc;valt ðrÞ. The prices
charged by the UCC are the price charged per outsourced
stop to the carrier Pucc;car;trt ðDcart;c jeccarc ¼ 0Þ, the price for the
base service charged to the receiver Pucc;rec;trt , and the price
to perform the value-adding services for a receiver Pucc;valt ðrÞ.
Finally, the UCC may receive a subsidy Pucc;sbt , which is a
percentage of the total prices charged to the carriers and the
receivers (only for the base service, not the value-adding
services). The cost function of the UCC is as follows:
Cucct c
rec;tr
t ; c
rec;val
t ; c
car
t ;Dt
 
¼ Cucc;tr Ducct
 
þCucc;hdt [
c2C
Dcart;c
 þXjRj
r¼1
crec;valt;r C
ucc;val
t rð Þ
Table 1. Overview of the agent types in the simulation framework.
Agent type Objective Constraints KPIs
Carrier Minimize costs Local regulations Costs transport
Costs outsourcing last-mile distribution
Costs administrative policies
Receiver Minimize costs Local regulations Costs receiving
Costs outsourcing last-mile distribution
Costs value-adding services (in-house)
Costs value-adding services (outsourced)
UCC Maximize profit Local regulations Income last-mile distribution
Income value-adding services
Costs transport
Costs value-adding services
Municipality Minimize environ- Profitability of the agents CO2 (global emissions)
Mental costs Functioning supply system SO2, NOx, PM2:5 (local emissions)
Number of vehicles (per type)
Total vehicle distance (per type)
Income administrative policies
Costs subsidies
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
XjCj
c¼1
ccart;c P
ucc;car;tr
t D
car
t;c jeccarc ¼ 0
 

XjRj
r¼1
crec;trt;r P
ucc;rec;tr
t

XjRj
r¼1
crec;valt;r P
ucc;val
t rð ÞPucc;sbt :
The final agent type is the municipality. For this agent,
we measure the following KPIs, (i) subsidy expenses, (ii)
policy income, (iii) emissions, (iv) distance per vehicle type,
and (v) number of vehicles per type. We do not assign
weights to these KPIs and therefore do not introduce an
explicit cost function. Instead, based on a relative compari-
son between schemes, we monitor whether environmental
performance justified the financial costs of the scheme.
4. Experimental setup
In this section, we describe the setup of the simulation
study. The goal of the study is to find sustainable business
models for the UCC and which combinations of administra-
tive measures best aid such models. As high costs are the
main barrier for a starting UCC, we consider the use of sub-
sidies and regulations to encourage the use of the UCC in
the startup phase. To this end, we test a variety of measures
to support the UCC. Subsidies are awarded for 2 years
(equal to the actual subsidy period of the real Copenhagen
UCC), implying that the UCC has limited time to create a
sufficiently large user base such that the operational costs
are low enough to offer competitive prices. Each simulation
run represents a period of 5 years; the performance in the
last 2 years is used to evaluate whether the UCC achieves
the desired performance. Lebeau et al. (2017) state that
UCCs could operate stably after 3 years, although longer
startup periods are also reported.
Of particular interest is the sequence in which users are
attracted. If the receiver selects the UCC, the carrier supply-
ing this receiver essentially outsources its last-mile distribu-
tion without costs (as receivers typically do not have direct
transport contracts with carriers, see Verlinde et al. (2012)).
From this perspective, it is sensible to first generate commit-
ment from the carriers, as this leaves open the possibility of
receivers paying for value-adding services. Receivers, on the
other hand, may be easier to convince to use the UCC, as
their perceived benefits (including value-adding services) are
usually greater than for the carrier (according to the expert
interviews). Indeed, Browne et al. (2007) state that receivers
typically are the primary source of income for UCCs and
list the most benefits for this group of users, although they
point out that quantification of the benefits is challenging.
We emphasize that there is no general consensus on the
user benefits for UCCs; for example, Marcucci and Danielis
(2008) state that in fact carriers benefit more than receivers
from the UCC. In our simulation, we test a variety of sub-
sidy allocations to observe how they affect the sequence in
which users commit to the UCC.
4.1. Validation
This study aims to perform experiments in a setting that is
sufficiently close to reality to draw practically applicable
conclusions. We discuss the steps that we have taken to val-
idate the match between our simulation model and the
real world.
The problems that we study are motivated by practice
and affirmed by the propositions posed in literature. Also,
the measures that we evaluate are existing in the real world.
For our default setting, we consider the measures that are
currently in effect in the city of Copenhagen. The other
measures that we test are implemented or have been imple-
mented in other Western European cities; it is conceivable
that such measures might be implemented in Copenhagen
as well. To select appropriate levels for the parameters and
variables in our simulation model, we collect data both from
a variety of literature sources and directly from industry; we
provide a detailed description of our data collection in
Section 4.2.
To validate the data as well as the experimental setup, we
conducted expert interviews with two parties. The first
expert represents Binnenstadservice, which operates 15
UCCs in the Netherlands. The second expert is from the
municipality of Copenhagen, and is involved with local reg-
ulations and logistics initiatives. The interviews consisted of
open components for the experts to share their vision on
UCC operations and our experimental setup, as well as
closed questions on business practice and policy implemen-
tation. Finally, we posed specific requests for data on, e.g.,
costs, prices, and subsidy levels.
Rather than modeling agents based on—often sparse—
available data, Anand et al. (2016) propose to model agent
behavior on their revealed preferences obtained by stake-
holder. We have done so indirectly by consulting the UCC
expert and assuming financially rational decision-making.
Although this suffices to fill the current gap in literature,
follow-up research that consults a larger number of experts
might more accurately validate the model and more closely
represent reality by adopting a behavioral approach that
incorporates, e.g., the willingness to pay for services under
varying circumstances.
4.2. Data collection
Our primary data sources are documents from the Green
Logistics project and the BESTUFS project (Allen et al.,
2008; Browne et al., 2005; Schoemaker et al., 2006); both
projects aggregated real-life data from many different cities
and sources. To obtain data that best represents the case of
Copenhagen, we restrict ourselves to the data available for
Western European cities. Furthermore, we exclude data out-
side the scope of this study, such as full truckload transport,
construction logistics, and transport of perishable goods.
The data sources reveal great variations in urban logistics
metrics, while some parameters lack proper documentation.
For certain parameters, we must therefore make justified
assumptions on what our representation of reality looks like.
The data set that we constructed has been validated during
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the expert interviews; various parameters were altered to
obtain a closer fit with practice. We proceed to discuss our
data set in the remainder of this section.
4.2.1. Network design
We use OpenStreetMap to obtain retailer locations. Filtering
out certain branches unsuitable for UCC distribution, an ini-
tial set of 1071 locations remains, consisting primarily of
fashion stores, bicycle stores, convenience stores, and speci-
alized stores. Van Duin et al. (2010) state that a participa-
tion rate of about 10% is a realistic figure for UCCs. Even
heavily supported UCCs such as the one in La Rochelle han-
dle no more than 30% of freight transport to the city
(Browne et al., 2005). We do not foresee any scenario in
which our fictional UCC in Copenhagen achieves a higher
user percentage than that. Adopting the figure as an upper
bound, we randomly select 30% of the retailers from our
initial location set, leaving us with 321 retailer locations in
our test network. In Section 5.2, we test alternative bounds
ranging from 10% to 50%. For the UCC location, we use the
location of Citylogistik-kbh, the UCC currently operating in
Copenhagen. We use the OpenStreetMap routing implemen-
tation of Luxen and Vetter (2011) to compute the travel
times between all origin-destination pairs. The generated
travel times take into account factors such as the configur-
ation of the street network, speed limits, and restrictions
such as one-way streets.
4.2.2. Receiver properties
The properties of the individual retailers are not directly
available; both literature and expert interviews emphasize
that the order patterns of retailers vary greatly. We intro-
duce six distinct retailer profiles based on order patterns
and demands for value-adding services. From the observed
data, we distill the following properties that define a receiver
profile: (i) average order volume, (ii) average order fre-
quency, (iii) number of suppliers, and (iv) demand for
value-added services. The receiver profiles are summarized
in Table 2.
The first three properties are correlated and depend on
whether the receiver has a centralized or a decentralized
supply system (Cherrett et al., 2012). Receiver with central-
ized supply systems have a single supplier, resulting in rela-
tively few deliveries and higher volumes. We assume that
the ratio between receivers with centralized and decentral-
ized supply chains is 50/50. In reality, decentralized supply
chains might be more suited for UCC use. However, in
practice supply chains are rarely purely (de)centralized
(Cherrett et al., 2012), but some form of hybrid. This makes
it difficult to determine the actual ratio. As decentralized
systems result in more delivery stops and therefore higher
UCC income, the 50/50 ratio implies a safety margin for
our results. The sensitivity analysis in Section 5.2 includes
various ratios to quantify the effect of this assumption.
Based on Cherrett et al. (2012), we estimate for central-
ized profiles an average of 4.05 deliveries/week and for
decentralized profiles an average of 11.65 deliveries/week.
Each receiver has 3-5 ordering moments per week; central-
ized profiles place orders with one supplier at a time (aver-
aging to 4  4:05 deliveries per week) and decentralized
profiles place orders with 2–4 distinct suppliers at a time
(averaging to 12  11:65 deliveries per week). The order
volumes are drawn from empirical distributions that are
based on the data provided by a Dutch UCC facility.
Next, we consider the demand for value-adding services.
Our interviews reveal that demand is highly receiver-spe-
cific, both in terms of the required services and willingness
to pay. Based on price data from the Dutch UCC, we cat-
egorize three levels of demands. Table 2 shows the proper-
ties of the receiver profiles. Receiver-specific values are
uniformly drawn from the indicated ranges.
Finally, based on Van Duin et al. (2010), we set the per-
sonnel costs (used to quantify receiving costs) at e15.3/hour.
The average unloading time lies in the range of 7-34minutes
(Allen et al., 2008; Schoemaker et al., 2006). Deliveries of
larger volumes do not necessarily translate into longer
unloading times (Cherrett et al., 2012). As many factors
(e.g., accessibility, handling equipment, quality checks) may
influence both the total unloading time and the time the
receiver itself is actually involved, we (i) randomly assign an
unloading time to receivers from the indicated range (as
experienced by the carrier) and (ii) randomly select a value
between 2minutes and the generated total unloading time to
indicate how much time the receiver spends on unloading.
4.2.3. Carrier properties
We proceed to describe the properties of carriers. First, we
need to establish the number of carriers in our simulation
model. With our demand settings and distribution of
receiver profiles, about 2,500 deliveries per working week
take place for the target group. Based on Browne et al.
(2005), Allen et al. (2008), and Roca-Riu and Estrada (2012),
we find that the average number of stops per carrier visiting
a city is approximately 10. As we are primarily interested in
small, independent carriers, we select the number of carriers
such that every carrier uses one truck on average for a deliv-
ery route. To achieve this average, we set the number of car-
riers in our simulation to 50. The number of trucks actually
deployed depends on the realization of order demand; a car-
rier may simultaneously deploy multiple trucks.
As the transport market is characterized by high competi-
tion and high substitutability, we assume that all carriers
operate homogenous fleets composed of medium-sized
vehicles with a capacity of 28 m3. This assumption isolates
the measured effect of the UCC from the potential mode
Table 2. Summary of the receiver profiles.
Profile
Order
frequency
No. of orders
placed per
Demand
value-adding % of total
per week ordering moment services per week receivers
i [3–5] [1] [e0] 10%
ii [3–5] [1] [e6–20] 37.5%
iii [3–5] [1] [e60–150] 2.5%
iv [3–5] [2-4] [e0] 10%
v [3–5] [2-4] [e6–20] 37.5%
vi [3–5] [2-4] [e60–150] 2.5%
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shift. A drawback is that the model does not reflect differen-
ces in fleet composition, such that financial and environ-
mental distinctions between modes are ignored in the
present study. Emission data is obtained from Boer et al.
(2011), based on engine standards that are set for the year
2020. The cost parameters are itemized in hourly costs
(mainly driver’s wage, including unloading time) and costs
per km (diesel and depreciation). The corresponding values
are obtained from Quak and de Koster (2009) and Roca-Riu
et al. (2016), and can be found in Table 3. Recall that the
average unloading time at the delivery locations lies in the
range of 7-34minutes. Unlike the receiver, the driver is
involved during the complete unloading process, hence the
hourly costs are incurred for the duration of the process.
4.2.4. UCC properties
We discuss costs and prices of the UCC, the summary can
be found in Table 4. The costs of the UCC might be divided
into three components, handling costs (including, e.g., rent,
handling equipment, and personnel hours), transport costs,
and costs for value-adding services. Handling costs strongly
depend on the volumes handled and the corresponding
economies of scale (Van Duin et al., 2010); estimates in lit-
erature vary widely. We estimate handling costs by triangu-
lating the figures provided by Browne et al. (2005) and Van
Duin et al. (2010) with the expert estimates. We set han-
dling costs at e20/m3 for a UCC without any agents com-
mitted (i.e., the initialization of the handling costs) and e7/
m3 if all orders are delivered via the UCC. The updating
procedure of the handling costs over time has been
described in Section 3.2. Two additional cost ranges based
on literature are tested in our experiments.
We proceed with transport costs. In reality, UCCs may
deploy a heterogeneous fleet; for the current study this
would overly complicate both the representation of the
model and the interpretation of the results. In line with Van
Duin et al. (2010), we assume that the UCC operates a fleet
of light trucks with a loading capacity of 18 m3. We use the
same data sources as for the carrier; the vehicle parameters
for light trucks can also be found in Table 3.
Finally, we discuss the costs of value-adding services. We
estimate that the upper bounds for the costs of the UCC to
perform the value-adding services fall in the range of 70%
to 95% of the costs the receiver makes to perform these
services in-house. The lower bounds are equivalent to 0.8
times the upper bounds. The bounds are generated ran-
domly for each receiver.
Based on confidential price data provided by the UCC
expert, we set representative price ranges for the UCC.
Receivers always pay a monthly fee for the base service of
the UCC (i.e., bundled deliveries); the expert indicates that
this fee is typically independent of receiver location and
delivery volumes. We set the price range for the base service
for receivers at e60-70 per month. Carriers using the UCC
pay per outsourced delivery stop. The corresponding price
range is set at e12-18 per stop. Finally, we set the profit
margin on value-added services at 20% (i.e., the price is
125% of the costs).
4.2.5. Municipality properties
Aside from implementing regulations, the main design
choice for the municipality is how to distribute subsidies.
Subsidies might be based on, e.g., the forwarded volume, the
number of trucks, or time elapsed. A good subsidy scheme
should be in accordance with three principles: (i) it should
be simple and predictable to create valid business models,
(ii) it must not favor or discriminate against individual
actors (as this is politically prohibited), and (iii) it should be
feasible to implement and to verify (e.g., the municipality
should be able to check if allocation criteria are satisfied). In
our simulation model, subsidies are provided to agents as a
fixed percentage of the UCC price charged to the agents
using the UCC, thereby essentially serving as a price dis-
count to the end-users. For receivers, the subsidy is based
only on the price for the basic last-mile delivery service, not
the prices for value-adding services. Subsidy schemes are
terminated after 2 years.
4.3. Scenarios
We conclude this section by outlining our scenarios. We
introduce seven test variables (indicated by the capital letters
A-G), for which we evaluate three different levels corre-
sponding to ‘low’ (I), ‘medium’ (II), and ‘high’ (III) esti-
mates of the variable. Variable B only has two levels. The
variable levels are shown in Table 5; each unique combin-
ation of variables represents a scheme. We apply a full fac-
torial design, resulting in 21  36 ¼ 1; 458 schemes to
evaluate. For some variables that are particularly prone to
Table 4. Summary of UCC cost- and price components.
Component Value Description
Costs transport 0.72 e/km þ21e/hour Route-dependent
Costs handling 7–20 e/m3 Depending on volume ratio, excluding transport
Costs value-adding services 56–95% of in-house costs Depending on volume ratio, max. 20% reduction
Price carriers e12–18 per stop Depending on volume ratio
Price base service receivers e60–70 per month Depending on volume ratio
Price value-adding services 125% of costs Depending on costs value-adding services
Table 3. Vehicle properties for carriers (medium-sized truck) and UCC
(light truck).
Vehicle type Light truck Medium-sized truck
Load capacity (m3) 18 28
Driver’s wage (e/hour) 21 21
Costs urban transport (e/km) 0.72 0.86
(excluding driver’s wage)
CO2 (g/km) 455–553 821–1,065
SO2 (mg/km) 3.5–4.2 6.3–8.1
NOx (g/km) 1.5–1.8 2.7–3.5
PM2:5 (mg/km) 35–37 53–59
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change (based on preliminary tests), we perform additional
sensitivity analysis in Section 5.2.
The expert interviews revealed that the municipality has
limited power to implement regulations, as they are bound
by government laws. This view is confirmed by the study of
Gammelgaard (2015). Measures such as, e.g., city access
exclusively for electric trucks, are not viable in the foresee-
able future. In this study, we therefore restrict ourselves to
measures that are conceivable in the context of urban freight
logistics within Denmark, either currently or in the
near future.
We start by describing the administrative measures; in
both cases the UCC is exempted. Copenhagen currently
allows vehicles to deliver in the medieval center only
between 9.00 and 11.00am. Our first test variable (A) there-
fore relates to the adjustment of this access time restriction.
We test two alternatives, namely setting the window between
7.00 and 9.00 (requiring receivers to commit extra personnel
hours for receiving goods) and omitting the access time
window (potentially enabling carriers to reduce the required
number of trucks). Test variable (B) refers to the zone-
access fee for trucks; which in the current system is negli-
gible for frequently visiting trucks and therefore set to 0. As
alternative value we use e7 per visit; the city has used the
same fee for certain vehicles back in 2002 (OECD, 2003).
Next, we discuss the subsidy measures that we test.
Although the municipality expert indicated that the willing-
ness to subsidize UCC initiatives is currently low,
Citylogistik-kbh has received public funding in the recent
past (Gammelgaard, 2015). In our experiments, we assume a
two-year subsidy period; after this period Citylogistik-kbh
went private as well. Subsidies might also be awarded to
receivers or carriers for utilizing the UCC. Subsidizing car-
riers (variable C) or receivers (variable D) might generate
initial commitment from these parties and lower the operat-
ing costs of the UCC. Variable E represents subsidies
awarded directly to the UCC.
The operational costs of the UCC have a strong impact
on its performance; as noted before, the obtained estimates
for these costs vary widely. Variable F sets three cost ranges
that each represent lower and upper bounds for the han-
dling costs, with the handling costs per m3 decreasing lin-
early with the increase in volume handled (see Section 3.2).
Finally, variable G tests the impact of the profit margin that
the UCC makes on value-adding services; we test profit
margins of 0%, 20%, and 33.3%.
5. Results
In this section, we present the results of our simulation
experiments. First, we address the financial and environmen-
tal performance of the individual agents in Section 5.1. We
perform sensitivity analysis on several variables in Section 5.2.
Each simulation run represents a time period of 5 years.
Subsidies may be awarded in the first 2 years, the third year
is simulated for the system to stabilize and to reach a steady
state. To compute the KPIs, we use the final 2 years of the
simulation. We compare the KPIs obtained for all tested
schemes to the performance under the default scheme, in
which the city can be accessed by carriers between 9.00 and
11.00am (AII), there is no zone-access fee (BI), there are no
subsidies (CI, DI, EI), and the UCC has handling costs
between 7 and 20 e/m3 (FII) and a profit margin on value-
adding services of 20% (GII). Comparing KPIs to this default
scheme provides insights into the financial performance of
the agents. We take the average performance of all agents
for a given agent type to compute the performance indica-
tors. Using the batch means method, we set the number of
simulation runs per scheme at 10.
5.1. Performance
In this section, we discuss both the financial and environ-
mental impact of various schemes, focusing on the generic
insights obtained.
First, we discuss how the financial performance of each
agent type is affected by adjusting the variable levels. Figure
2 shows the financial performance per agent type (excluding
the municipality) for the tested schemes; to aid the visual
presentation only every 7th data point are displayed and
scenarios are sorted on UCC performance. A positive per-
centage implies an improvement on the financial KPIs, a
negative percentage indicates a loss compared to the default
scenario. Based on our analysis, the main findings with
respect to financial performance are that (i) it is challenging
to find schemes that result in a profitable UCC (only
markers above the 100% line imply a profitable UCC), (ii)
receivers are very inclined to use the UCC when shifted
access time windows are introduced, (iii) carriers strongly
benefit from the UCC under receiver-oriented schemes (as
they can freely outsource their last-mile distribution), and
(iv) the schemes under which the UCC performs best are
schemes under which carriers considerably improve their
performance and receivers improve marginally.
Table 5. Variable levels.
Indicator Variable Level I Level II Level III
A Access times 7.00–9.00am 9.00–11.00am No restrictions
B Zone-access fee e0 e7
C Subsidies carriers 0% of costs per 10% of costs per 20% of costs per
outsourced stop outsourced stop outsourced stop
D Subsidies receivers 0% of costs 10% of costs 20% of costs for
base service base service base service
E Subsidies UCC 0% of prices charged 10% of prices charged 20% of prices charged
for base service and for base service and for base service and
outsourced stops outsourced stops outsourced stops
F UCC handling costs 2–11 e/m3 7–20 e/m3 26–56 e/m3
G Margin value-adding services 0% 20% 33.3%
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Table 6 shows the impact of changing each variable on
the financial KPIs of carriers, receivers, and the UCC, with
positive signs indicating performance improvement. For
each alternative variable level, we show its isolated effect
(changing only a single variable level and setting all other
variable levels at default), main effect (the average difference
between all pairs of equivalent schemes, with a single vari-
able level altered in one of the pairs), worst-case effect (the
largest negative effect from the pairs of schemes), and best-
case effect (the largest positive effect from the pairs
of schemes).
We proceed to reflect on the influence of each variable.
Shifting time windows (AI) is a very effective measure to
commit receivers to the UCC as it allows receivers to pay
extra receiving costs. However, as a result carriers have no
need to pay the UCC, which typically translates to insuffi-
cient income in schemes that contain this measure.
Removing time access restrictions (AIII) on average results
in 6 less carriers selecting the UCC, which ultimately trans-
lates into higher losses for the UCC. Imposing a zone-access
fee (BIII) results in a higher use of the UCC when combined
with other measures; as a stand-alone measure it does not
suffice to make carriers adjust their behavior.
We have tested six settings related to subsidies
(CII,CIII,DII,DIII,EII,EIII). Subsidizing carriers or the UCC
yields positive effects, yet subsidizing carriers appears more
efficient. Subsidizing receivers has little effect. All subsidy
measures have a limited impact as a stand-alone measure;
they must be combined with other measures to achieve a
sustainable state after the subsidy period ends.
Adjusting the estimated handling costs at the UCC (FI
and FIII) has a strong impact on the financial performance
of the UCC; we found no sustainable schemes for the high-
cost setting. Finally, varying the profit margin on value-
Figure 2. Financial performance, segregated per agent type for all scenarios. Performance is relative to the default scenario (represented by the 0% line); positive
percentages indicate an improvement.
Table 6. Financial impact per variable level, segregated per agent type (receiver, car-
rier, UCC).
Variable level
Isolated effect Main effect Worst-case effect Best-case effect
Rec. Car. UCC Rec. Car. UCC Rec. Car. UCC Rec. Car. UCC
AI –14% 75% 9% –14% 72% –49% –25% 35% –1245% –10% 78% 25%
AIII 0% –2% –3% 0% –3% –41% –3% –55% –1129% 5% 17% 5%
BIII 0% –5% –4% 0% –6% 14% –11% –136% –4% 4% 35% 563%
CII 1% –1% –2% 0% 3% 4% –9% –4% –2% 2% 40% 122%
CIII 1% –1% –2% 1% 8% 24% –9% –136% –2% 2% 37% 163%
DII 6% –5% –2% 0% 0% –1% –4% –8% –50% 6% 8% 38%
DIII 3% –3% 0% 0% 1% –3% –6% –5% –75% 7% 12% 38%
EII 3% 0% –3% 0% 3% 4% –10% –3% –3% 4% 37% 129%
EIII 1% –1% –2% 1% 8% 24% –9% –136% –4% 4% 40% 163%
FI 0% 0% 5% 0% 0% 36% 0% 0% 5% 0% 0% 634%
FIII 0% 0% –14% 0% 0% –41% 0% 0% –612% 0% 0% –10%
GI 0% 0% –1% 0% 0% –3% 0% 0% –63% 0% 0% 0%
GIII 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 5% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 563%
Figures marked gray indicate a minor impact on the financial KPI (between –5% and 5%),
red indicates a major negative impact (–5% or worse), and green indicates a major positive
impact (þ5% or better).
A, access time window; B, zone-access fee; C, subsidy carriers; D, subsidy receivers; E, subsidy
UCC; F, UCC handling costs; G, margin value-adding services.
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adding services (GI and GIII) has an impact on the net
income of the UCC, yet the overall impact is relatively small
as income from value-adding services is only about 15%.
To summarize, most measures have a limited effect when
implemented on a stand-alone basis (only the shift of time
windows has a considerable impact on all agent types), but
in combination with other measures particularly subsidies
(to UCC and carrier) and zone-access fees generally have a
positive impact. Later in this section, we list the parameter
settings that correspond to the best-performing scheme
under average cost settings.
Our analysis of the numerical results indicates that the
sequence in which UCC users are attracted is decisive for
the eventual profitability of a scheme. Figure 3 shows the
income and costs for the UCC over time for a scheme that
focuses on attracting carriers before receivers, Figure 4
shows the same information for a scheme that aims to
attract receivers first. The scheme that aims to first commit
carriers performs notably better. Although the receiver-ori-
ented scheme attracts more users overall, the UCC obtains
its revenue solely from the receivers. In the carrier-oriented
scheme we observe a drop in the number of committed
receivers when the subsidies are ended, yet the UCC
remains profitable in the years that follow.
We try to identify schemes that yield a positive net result
for the UCC without decreasing the financial performance
of the other agents, thereby providing a rational base for
long-term sustainability. Figure 5 shows the financial KPIs
for the best scheme—in terms of UCC profitability—com-
pared to the performance under the default scheme. Despite
Figure 3. Financial performance for the UCC under a scheme that primarily aims to attract carriers, using the settings AII, BI, CI, DI, EI, FI, GII.
Figure 4. Financial performance for the UCC under a scheme that primarily aims to attract receivers, using the settings AII, BI, CI, DI, EI, FI, GII.
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being the best-performing scheme under average cost set-
tings (FII and GII), it still yields a loss of 8.5% to the UCC.
The scheme is characterized by an access time window from
9.00 to 11.00, 20% subsidies to both carriers and the UCC,
and a zone-access fee of e7. It results in a cost reduction for
the carriers, virtually no cost change for the receivers, and a
major reduction in net costs for the UCC. In Section 5.2 we
fine-tune several variables of the best scheme to verify
whether profits are attainable under average cost settings for
the UCC.
We proceed to reflect on the relation between financial
and environmental performance. From an environmental
perspective, all schemes perform better than in the scenario
without a UCC. Compared to the default scenario, for the
less-than-truckload flows modeled in the simulation, the
best schemes reduce emissions by approximately 70%, the
total number of trucks in the city—i.e., both from carriers
and the UCC—by up to 60%, and the total distance driven
by up to 65%. These considerable benefits indicate that the
concept of a UCC makes sense from an environmental
perspective.
Table 7 compares the environmental KPIs for the finan-
cially best-performing scheme (see Figure 5) to the KPIs
under the default scheme. The difference between both
schemes shows a considerable improvement on all KPIs.
Compared to the default scheme, the best scheme reduces
emission levels by 68% up to 72%. Although the number of
small trucks in the city increases due to the higher use of
the UCC, the total number of trucks reduces by 61%,
whereas the total distance driven decreases by 67%.
5.2. Sensitivity analysis
We perform sensitivity analysis on variables that are both
subject to considerable variability and are expected (based
on preliminary tests) to have a significant impact on the
results, namely (i) the zone-access fee, (ii) the width of the
access time windows, (iii) the carrier subsidy level, (iv) the
UCC price for carriers, (v) the division between centralized
and decentralized receivers, and (vi) the size of the retailer
target group. We simulate with multiple numerical values
for each variable of interest, while keeping all other variables
at their default levels. Furthermore, we fine-tune several var-
iables in the financially best-performing scheme, as this
scheme—under average cost settings—yields financial losses
for the UCC.
We test zone-access fees in the range f0; 2; :::; 20g. We
find that under the default scheme, a fee of e12 is the tip-
ping point that spurs carriers to use the UCC. A fee of e18
or higher is needed for a profitable UCC. Although such
fees are likely too high for practical applications, this ana-
lysis indicates that tweaking the entrance fee may have a
substantial impact on the performance of a scheme.
The access time restriction of two hours that is currently
applied in the city of Copenhagen appears ineffective to per-
suade carriers to use the UCC. We test the impact of time
access window in the width range f0:5; 1; :::; 5g on the num-
ber of carriers that commit to the UCC. Windows with a
width up until one hour have the intended effect; for wider
Figure 5. Financial performance of carriers, receivers, and UCC under both the default scheme (AII, BI, CI, DI, EI, FII, GII) and the financially best-performing scheme
(AII, BII, CIII, DI, EIII, FII, GII).
Table 7. Performance on environmental KPIs compared between the default
scheme and the financially best-performing scheme.
KPI Default scheme Best scheme Change
CO2 (ton) 383.51 70.42 –72%
SO2 (kilogram) 2.92 0.53 –72%
NOx (ton) 1.26 0.23 –72%
PM2:5 (kilogram) 22.97 4.99 –68%
No. of small trucks 2,937 11,493 þ291%
No. of large trucks 26,244 0 –100%
Total no. of trucks 29,181 11,493 –61%
Distance small trucks (1000 km) 38 139 þ261%
Distance large trucks (1000 km) 385 0 –100%
Total distance trucks (1000 km) 423 139 –67%
All outcomes correspond to the final 2 years of the simulation.
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windows the number of committed carriers drops. Windows
wider than two hours do not aid in attracting carriers to
utilize the UCC, unless combined with other measures.
Attracting carriers as quickly as possible improves the
long-term financial sustainability of the UCC. We aim to
find the smallest subsidy amount that the municipality needs
to spend in order to commit carriers within a certain sub-
sidy period. We test 10 different subsidy levels—ranging
from 2% to 20%—and their effects on the commitment of
carriers over time, measured during the two-year subsidy
period. For levels over 12% half a year of subsidies suffices
to attract all carriers. For a level of 12% it takes one year;
levels lower than 12% fail to attract all carriers within 2
years. To attract higher numbers of carriers directly at the
start, a level of about 30% is required.
Because carriers are very price-sensitive, we test the
effects of various price levels on the commitment of carriers
to the UCC under the base scenario. In contrast to the price
bounds used in the main experiments, we now assume a
fixed price that is not altered over time. For price levels
higher than e9.5 per stop, the number of carriers that use
the UCC rapidly declines. However, at price levels of e9.5
and below, the UCC is not financially sustainable; a higher
price in combination with supporting measures is required
to ensure the required income for the UCC.
For the ratio between centralized and decentralized
receiver profiles, we test ratios 100/0, 75/25, 50/50/25/50,
and 0/100. We observe that decentralized profiles are more
likely to use the UCC (147 out of 321 receivers when all
have decentralized profiles, compared to 0 when all have
centralized profiles), leading to higher UCC incomes. Under
the default scheme the UCC remains financially unsustain-
able. When performing the same sensitivity analysis on the
best scheme, a higher share of decentralized profiles yields
profitable scenarios. Thus, profitability of the UCC with a
target group composed of relatively many decentralized pro-
files appears more likely.
To test the sensitivity to the size of the target group, we
take 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, and 50% of the 1071 receivers
and scale the number of carriers correspondingly. We com-
pare the relative losses and profits to verify whether the size
of the target group affects profitability, both for the default
scheme and the best scheme. For the default scheme the
impact is limited, although relative UCC losses decrease
when increasing the target group size. For the best scheme,
target groups larger than 30% actually yield profits for the
UCC (up to 7.7%), whereas smaller target groups result in
losses up to 31.5%.
We conclude this section with an evaluation of the
impact of fine-tuning the best-performing scheme (see
Figure 5), as a loss of 8.5% renders the UCC insolvent in
the long term. We highlight the adjustments that result in
UCC profits. Increasing subsidy levels for either the UCC or
the carriers from 20% to 30% instantly commits almost all
carriers from the start, resulting in a profit of 12.1% for the
UCC. Lowering the price of the base service from e60–70 to
e40–50 results in 15% more receivers in the steady state and
pushes the profit margin of the UCC to 2.2%. Finally,
raising the zone-access fee from e7 to e9 yields a profit of
0.3% for the UCC. These results show that relatively small
price changes may considerably impact the profitability of
the UCC.
6. Conclusions
In this study we tested 1,458 different schemes, for which
we measured both financial and environmental KPIs.
Considerable environmental improvements may be achieved
through the use of a UCC, reducing truck kilometers driven
in the city by about 65% and reducing emissions by about
70%. The key challenge is to find schemes that are also
financially sustainable. The UCC is able to obtain the high-
est revenues by first convincing carriers to outsource their
stops and subsequently selling value-adding services to the
receivers in the city. Adopting a strictly financial perspective
for decision-making (thus not monetizing environmental
costs), the concept of a UCC appears to be unsuccessful
without supporting measures. Temporary subsidies to the
carriers and imposing a zone-access fee are the most effect-
ive measures in achieving a steady state in which the UCC
is profitable and may operate without external funding after
reaching a certain scale of operations. We do stress, how-
ever, that also in our simulation achieving financial stability
is highly challenging and even unattainable for certain cost
settings. Although several schemes show that the UCC may
ultimately survive without subsidies, we do not claim that
this is attainable for all UCCs in practice; both the user base
and the operational costs are crucial in this regard.
The obtained insights correspond to recent findings in
literature; see, e.g., Kim et al. (2015) and Van Duin et al.
(2016) for insights comparable to ours. In particular, the
importance of supporting regulation, the focus on carriers as
the main source of income, and the need to reach suffi-
ciently high throughput within limited time are common
themes in literature. Although the importance of regulation
in general has been validated, the effectiveness of individual
administrative policies and their combinations cannot be
sufficiently verified based on existing literature.
We discuss the impact of the two most important devia-
tions from practice of our simulation model. First, the
sequence in which carriers and receivers commit to the
UCC in our model is crucial. Due to instantaneous deci-
sion-making by the agents combined with varying price lev-
els, decisions made in the early stages of the simulation
greatly impact the steady-state performance of the UCC. In
practice decisions are made more gradually; the main take-
away remains that the focus must be on attracting carriers
first and that administrative measures should support this
approach. A second deviation from practice is that the simu-
lated UCC adopts volume-dependent price ranges. Although
the underlying argument of economies of scale holds for the
operating costs, in practice the continuous price changes
might confuse users and require frequent contract renegotia-
tions. The main reason for using ranges rather than fixed
price levels is to identify steady states more easily. As fixed
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price levels may only work for a specific scheme, it is diffi-
cult to make generic statements regarding single price levels.
General limitations of our work are the lack of data for
some properties—necessitating several strong assumptions,
particularly regarding the cost structure of the UCC and the
order patterns of potential UCC users—and the small num-
ber of experts consulted. Although we have made the effort
to cross-check data with our expert interviews and take into
account practical points of view as much as possible, add-
itional data sources and expert interviews might aid in vali-
dating and extending the findings presented in this paper.
We conclude this paper with the key managerial insights
obtained from the experiments.
 The commitment of carriers to the UCC should be
ensured before targeting the receivers.
 Subsidies are most effectively allocated to the carriers.
 Access time restrictions only aid the UCC if the access
window is set sufficiently narrow.
 Setting access time restrictions before the opening times
of stores is an effective measure to generate commitment
from receivers.
 Zone-access fees can have a positive effect in combin-
ation with other measures.
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